Primary source documents

chapter 13: Theological developments during the medieval time

Dionysius Areopagita, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy

Source: Joseph Cullen Ayer, A Source Book for Ancient Church History. From the Apostolic age to the Close of the Conciliar Period, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1941, 562-4.

Dionysius the Areopagite was an anonymous writer who claimed to be person who became a Christian after listening to Paul’s sermon mentioned in Acts 17:34. The time of his writing is not known, but the writings under his name stem at the earliest from the late 5th century. Dionysius’ writings show a strongly Neo-Platonist version of Christianity that was, however, very influential in the history of theology. In the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius describes the church as an image of, and as hierarchically graded as, the heavenly order. The texts below on the nature of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and on the sacraments show how church and sacraments both contribute to the process of deification.

The nature of the ecclesiastical hierarchy

   That our hierarchy […] which is given by God, is Godinspired and divine, a divinely acting knowledge, activity, and completion, we must show from the supernal and most Holy Scriptures to those who through hierarchical secrets and traditions have been initiated into the holy consecration […] Jesus, the most divine and most transcendent spirit, the principle and the being and the most divine power of every hierarchy, holiness, and divine operation, brings to the blessed beings superior to us a more bright and at the same time more spiritual light and makes them as far as possible like to His own light. And through our love which tends upward toward Him, by the love of the beautiful which draws us up to Him, He brings together into one our many heterogeneities; that He might perfect them so as to become a uniform and divine life, condition, and activity, He gives us the power of the divine priesthood. In consequence of this honor we arrive at the holy activity of the priesthood, and so we ourselves come near to the beings over us, that we, so far as we are able, approximate to their abiding and unchangeable holy state and so look up to the blessed and divine brilliancy of Jesus, gaze religiously on what is attainable by us to see, and are illuminated by the knowledge of what is seen; and thus we are initiated into the mystic science, and, initiating, we can become light-like and divinely working, complete and completing. 
  
The sacraments

   Salvation can in no other way come about than that the saved are deified. The deification is the highest possible resemblance to God and union with Him. The common aim of all the hierarchy is the love which hangs upon God and things divine, which fills with a divine spirit and works in godlike fashion; and before this is the complete and never retreating flight from that which is opposed to it, the knowledge of being as being, the vision and knowledge of the holy truth, the divinely inspired participation in the homogeneous perfection of the One himself, so far as man can come to that, the enjoyment of the holy contemplation, which spiritually nourishes and deifies every one who strives for it.

Anselm, Proslogion 3 and 4 – the ontological proof of God’s existence.

Source: Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury. Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000, 94-5.

Anselm (1033-1109) was the most important theologian of the eleventh century. Originally from Northern Italy, he entered the Benedictine monastery at Bec in Normandy and later became its abbot. Later, in 1093, he was consecrated as archbishop of Canterbury.

One of his most significant theological arguments is his so-called ontological proof of God’s existence, an attempt to show logically that the non-existence of God is inconceivable.
The text below is a small extract from the Proslogion, written around 1077-8, a book that was originally titled ‘Faith Seeking Understanding’.

Chapter Three

   [God] cannot be thought not to exist.
   Assuredly, this [being] exists so truly [i.e., really] that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something which cannot be thought not to exist; and this thing is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought—[a consequence] which is contradictory. Hence, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist. And You are this [being], O Lord our God. Therefore, O Lord my God, You exist so truly that You cannot even be thought not to exist. And this is rightly the case. For if any mind could think of something better than You, the creature would rise above the Creator and would sit in judgment over the Creator—something which is utterly absurd. Indeed, except for You alone, whatever else exists can be thought not to exist. Therefore, You alone exist most truly of all and thus most greatly of all; for whatever else exists does not exist as truly [as do You] and thus exists less greatly [than do You]. Since, then, it is so readily clear to a rational mind that You exist most greatly of all, why did the Fool say in his heart that God does not exist? [Psalms 13:1 and 52:1 (14:1 and 53:1).] —why [indeed] except because [he is] foolish and a fool!
  
Chapter Four

   How the Fool said in his heart that which cannot be thought.
   Yet, since to speak in one's heart and to think are the same thing, how did [the Fool] say in his heart that which he was unable to think, or how was he unable to think that which he did say in his heart? Now, if he truly [i.e., really]—rather, since he truly—both thought [what he did] because he said [it] in his heart and did not say [it] in his heart because he was unable to think [it], then it is not the case that something is said in the heart, or is thought, in only one way. For in one way a thing is thought when the word signifying it is thought, and in another way [it is thought] when that which the thing is understood. Thus, in the first way but not at all in the second, God can be thought not to exist. Indeed, no one who understands that which God is can think that God does not exist, even though he says these words [viz., “God does not exist”] in his heart either without any signification or with some strange signification. For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Anyone who rightly understands this, surely understands that that [than which a greater cannot be thought] exists in such way that it cannot even conceivably not exist. Therefore, anyone who understands that God is such [a being] cannot think that He does not exist.
   Thanks to You, good Lord, thanks to You—because what at first I believed through Your giving, now by Your enlightening I understand to such an extent that [even] if I did not want to believe that You exist, I could not fail to understand [that You exist].

Anselm, Why God became a man (Cur deus homo). Book I: 11-13. 20 – the satisfaction theory of the atonement.

Source: Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury. Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000, 318-322. 337.

An important contribution of Anselm (1033-1109) was his soteriological ‘satisfaction theory’, a theory that explained why God had to become man in order to satisfy the sin committed by man. The satisfaction theory largely replaced the previously popular ‘ransom theory’ of the atonement.
Below are some extracts from Anselm’s long argument.

Chapter Eleven

A. Therefore, we must ask on what basis God forgives men their sins. To do this more clearly, let us first see what sinning and making satisfaction for sin are.
B. It is up to you to explain and up to me to pay attention.
A. If angels and men always rendered to God what they ought to, then they would never sin.
B. I cannot contradict this.
A. Therefore, to sin is nothing other than not to render to God what is due.
B. What is the debt which we owe to God?
A. The will of every rational creature ought to be subordinate to the will of God.
B. Nothing is truer.
A. This is the debt which angels and men owe to God. No one who pays this debt sins; and everyone who does not pay it does sin. This is the justice-of-will, or uprightness-of-will, which makes men just, or upright, in heart (i.e., in will). This is the sole and complete honor which we owe to God and which God demands from us. For only such a will, when it is able to act, does works which are acceptable to God; and when it is not able to act, it alone is acceptable in itself, since without it no work is acceptable to God. Whoever does not pay to God this honor due Him dishonors Him and removes from Him what belongs to Him; and this removal, or this dishonoring, constitutes a sin. However, as long as he does not repay what he has stolen, he remains guilty. But it is not enough for him merely to repay what has been stolen; rather, because of the wrong which has been inflicted, he ought to repay more than he has stolen. […]

CHAPTER TWELVE

A. Let us go back and see whether it is fitting for God to forgive sin out of mercy alone, apart from any repayment of the honor stolen from Him.
B. I see no reason why it is not fitting.
A. To forgive sin in this manner is identical with not punishing it. Now, in the absence of satisfaction, to order sin rightly is only to punish it; therefore, if sin is not punished, something disordered is forgiven.
B. What you say is reasonable.
A. But it is not fitting that God should forgive something that is disordered within His kingdom.
B. If I wished to say anything different, I fear that I would be sinning.
A. Therefore, it is not fitting that God should forgive sin that goes thus unpunished.
B. This follows.
A. There is also something else which follows if sin that goes thus unpunished is forgiven: viz., God would be dealing with the sinner and the non-sinner in the same way—something which is unsuitable for Him [to do].
[…]

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

A. Nothing ought less to be tolerated in the order of things than that the creature remove the honor owed to the Creator and not repay what he removes. […]
A. Therefore, God keeps nothing more justly than the honor of His dignity.
B. I have to admit it.
A. Do you think that God would keep His honor intact if He permitted it to be removed from Him in such way that neither did the thief repay it nor did God punish him?
B. I dare not say so.
A. Therefore, it is necessary either for the honor that has been removed to be repaid or else for punishment to result. Otherwise, either God would not be just to Himself or else He would not have the power to do the one or the other—heinous things even to think.

CHAPTER TWENTY

Satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of the sin. Man cannot make satisfaction by himself.
[…]

Mechthild of Magdeburg, The Flowing Light of the Godhead I:44

Source: Mechthild of Magdeburg. The Flowing Light of the Godhead. Translated and introduced by Frank Tobin, New York, Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1998, 61-2.

Mechthild of Magdeburg (c. 1208-82 or 94), one of the most famous medieval mystics, lived in a time of significant theological production and spiritual revival. She became a member of a community of Beguines, where she found opportunity to express herself spiritually and theologically. 

The text below is part of chapter 44 of her collection The Flowing Light of Godhead. Here we find a theology radically different from what we find in common theological production. Mechthild describes her visions of her soul’s encounter with the Lord in, one may say, deeply erotic language, thus reflecting a tremendous spiritual and psychological intimacy. It is not too surprising that a male-dominated ecclesial hierarchy found such spiritual language difficult to accept and eventually banned the Beguine communities.

   Then the bride of all delights goes to the Fairest of lovers in the secret chamber of the invisible Godhead. There she finds the bed and the abode of love prepared by God in a manner beyond what is human. Our Lord speaks:

“Stay, Lady Soul.”
“What do you bid me, Lord?”
“Take off your clothes.”
“Lord, what will happen to me then?”
“Lady Soul, you are so utterly formed to my nature
That not the slightest thing can be between you and me.
Never was an angel so glorious
That to him was granted for one hour
What is given to you for eternity.
And so you must cast off from you
Both fear and shame and all external virtues.
Rather, those alone that you carry within yourself
Shall you foster forever.
These are your noble longing
And your boundless desire.
These I shall fulfill forever
With my limitless lavishness.”

“Lord, now I am a naked soul
And you in yourself are a well-adorned God.
Our shared lot is eternal life
Without death.”

Then a blessed stillness
That both desire comes over them.
He surrenders himself to her,
And she surrenders herself to him.
What happens to her then – she knows –
And that is fine with me.
But this cannot last long.
When two lovers meet secretly,
They must often part from one another inseparably.

Dear friend of God, I have written for you this path of love. May God infuse it into your heart! Amen.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1 Question 1 Article 8

Source: Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.html (public domain), 87.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275) was the most important philosopher of the medieval time; his theology expresses basic features of the Roman Catholic theology that are still relevant today. He gave the historically most influential expression to the relationship between grace and nature: by describing grace as perfecting nature, not destroying it; and by describing the way Christians speak about God as an analogy of being (analogia entis)

The text below is article 8 of question 1 of part I of Thomas’ Summa Theologica. The book is a huge volume of 510 questions, each of which consisting of several articles, each article discussing in disputative form a core theological question. Thomas wrote the book in the years 1265-74, as he was teaching at the University of Paris. 

The text shows the structure of each of the questions that Thomas deals with. He first introduces arguments in favor and against; then, he discusses the merits of these arguments and introduces his own thoughts before finally replying to the initial arguments. The section below discusses the relationship between faith and reason; in other words, the role of reason and of authority in theological debate. It is this final section that contains the famous sentence ‘grace does not destroy nature but perfects it’ (in Latin gratia non sustulit sed perficit naturam).  


Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?

   Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought." But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are written that you may believe" (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

   Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

   On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).

   I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections---if he has any---against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

   Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

   Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.".

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. Part I Question 13 Article 6

Source: Summa Theologica by Saint Thomas Aquinas. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.html (public domain), 87.

In the section reprinted below, part of article 6 of question 13 of part I of the Summa Theologica, Thomas argues for a relationship of analogy between God and creation. When we speak about God we use common words from our familiar context, but as we apply them to God we cannot use them in an univocal sense (e.g., when speaking of different kinds of eagle we use the word ‘eagle’ univocally; however, when we say of a person he is an eagle we use the term ‘eagle’ equivocally), but only in an analogical sense.

   In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first.

   Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his.

   Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would include in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. 

   But as was shown above, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above.

William of Ockham, Quodlibeta VI Question 6, 2 -

Source: William of Ockham. Philosophical Writings. A Selection. Translated and with an introduction by Philotheus Boehner. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, 28-30.

William of Ockham (c.1285 – c.1349), from England, was an important late medieval philosopher and theologian who in many ways built a bridge to the Reformation. He was a member of the Franciscan order and highly critical of Thomas. His thought contributed to the dissolution of the philosophical synthesis of the realms of grace and nature. His voluntarist emphasis on God’s omnipotence and the contingency of all creatures prepared the ground for the work of the Reformers. In various aspects of his teaching, including the issue of the poverty of Christ, Ockham was in dispute with the ecclesial hierarchy.

Ockham wrote widely on logic, physics, theology, and on church-political questions. The text below is from the sixth book of his Quodlibeta. ‘Quodlibet’ means ‘whatever one likes’. In this context it refers to various topics that came up in public disputations. The discussion of whether we can have intuitive cognition of non-existent things – a rather abstract question – is interesting because, in response to the question, Ockham introduces some of his basic thought principles. One of these is that all things are possible for God, save those that involve a contradiction. Another principle introduced in this text is that God does not depend on the causality of created causes. With this principle, Ockham stated theologically the omnipotence of God.

2. Whether intuitive cognition can be had of an object that does not exist?
   It cannot: For it is a contradiction that there should be an act of seeing and nothing be seen; therefore it is a contradiction that there should be an act of seeing but the seen object not exist.
   On the contrary: Vision is a non-relative quality distinct from the object; without contradiction, therefore, it can occur without an object.
  
   On this question I lay down two conclusions. First: Intuitive cognition of a non-existent object is possible by the divine power. I prove this first by the article of faith 'I believe in God the Father almighty', which I understand in the following sense: Anything is to be attributed to the divine power, when it does not contain a manifest contradiction. But that this [i.e. cognition of a nonexistent object] should be produced by the power of God, does not contain a contradiction; therefore, etc.

   Again, on this article is based the famous maxim of the theologians: 'Whatever God can produce by means of secondary causes, He can directly produce and preserve without them'. From this maxim I argue thus. Every effect which God can produce by means of a secondary cause He can produce directly on His own account. God can produce intuitive sense cognition by means of an object; hence He can produce it directly on His own account.

   Furthermore, every non-relative reality that differs in its place and its subject [of inherence] from another non-relative reality can still exist by virtue of the divine power when the other non-relative reality is destroyed. But seeing a star in the sky, whether by sense or by intellect, is such a reality; therefore, etc.

   You may object that according to this argument it follows that there could be an intuitive and beatific vision of God without His actual presence as an object actually present to the intellect; which is false and erroneous. I answer that there is no logical connexion in the following way of arguing: 'Because God can make such an act of seeing without a created object (on which this act depends only as a secondary cause), therefore, there can be an intuitive and beatific vision of God without His actual presence as an object actually present to the intellect (an object on which this is dependent as its first cause)'. For though, according to the Doctors, God can make the proper effects of secondary causes without these secondary causes, nevertheless He cannot make any effect without its first cause. For this reason, just as it is not possible that a colour should, as efficient cause, cause itself to be seen in the eye unless it is actually present, so in like manner it is not possible that God should cause an act of seeing Him in the intellect unless His actual presence is given.

   Second conclusion: So far as natural causes are in question, an intuitive cognition cannot be caused or preserved if the object does not exist. The reason is this. A real effect cannot be caused, or brought from nothing into being, by that which is nothing. Hence, if we are speaking of the natural mode of causation, it requires for its existence both a productive and a preservative cause.

   You may object: 'If someone sees the sun and then enters a dark room, it appears to him that he sees the sun in the same place and of the same size. Hence a sight of the sun remains, when the sun is absent; and for the same reason would remain, even if I did not exist'. To this I answer: 'No sight of the sun does remain but there does remain a quality, viz. the light-impression in the eye, and it is this quality that is seen. And if the intellect formulates such a proposition as "Light is seen at the same place, etc." and gives its assent to it, it is deceived by this quality or impression which it sees'. 

   To the main argument I answer: It is a contradiction that an act of seeing should exist while that which is seen neither exists nor can exist in reality. Hence it is a contradiction that a chimera should be intuitively seen. But it is no contradiction that what is seen should be nothing actually existing outside its cause, provided only that it can exist in reality or has once been in the universe. And so it is in our case. It was thus that God from all eternity saw all things that could be made, and nevertheless they were then nothing.

 
Copyright 2015 Tobias Brandner. All rights reserved.
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